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
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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

TACTICAL DECEPTION--VITAL THEN,
VITAL NOW

MAJOR JAMES R. PETERSON 87-1985
insights into tomorrow

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PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to create an appreciation for the value of tactical deception and advocate an increased emphasis of deception in routine exercises, evaluations, and professional military education (PME). Deception has played a vital role throughout history. Since Biblical times, deception has meant the difference between victory and defeat. Deception is a conscious and rational effort to mislead an opponent to gain an advantage. It can make the weak appear strong and the distant seem near, create surprise, and significantly reduce casualties. Advances in technology and surveillance techniques, expanding open society, and increasing military roles have not reduced deception's value. In addition, the importance Soviets place on deception dictate that the United States military should increase its study and considerations of deception methods. Increasing the emphasis of deception into routine exercises, evaluations, and PME, the United States military can expand its knowledge and capabilities in this area. We must train as we will fight, and tactical deception is no exception. We then can transition from peace to war with the expertise and skill to fully exploit this vital tactic.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major James R Peterson graduated from South Dakota State University at Brookings, South Dakota on 24 May 1974 with a Bachelor of Science in Microbiology and a commission from the Reserve Officer Training Corps. In November of 1974 he reported to Williams AFB, Arizona to attend Undergraduate Pilot Training. He graduated in October 1975 and was assigned as a T-33 pilot in the 17th Defensive Systems Evaluation Squadron (DSES) at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. In May 1976 he upgraded to the EB-57 aircraft in the 17 DSES and became an instructor pilot. From September 1979 to May 1982, he was an instructor pilot in the F-101 with the 2nd Fighter Interceptor Training Squadron at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Major Peterson then upgraded to the F-106 and was stationed with the 5th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Minot AFB, North Dakota. While at Minot he served as a Flight Commander and F-106 Instructor Pilot. In March 1985, Major Peterson converted with the 5FIS to the F-15 and became Assistant Operations Officer. In August 1986 he enrolled at Air Command and Staff College. After graduation, Major Peterson will be assigned to the 33 Tactical Fighter Wing, Eglin AFB, Florida.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....	iii
About the Author.....	iv
Executive Summary.....	vi

CHAPTER ONE--A DECEPTION OVERVIEW

Introduction.....	1
The Deception Process.....	1
Tactical Deception Program.....	2
Tactical Deception's Importance.....	3

CHAPTER TWO--TACTICAL DECEPTION--VITAL THEN

Deception Factors.....	6
Secrecy, Organization, and Coordination.....	6
Plausibility and Confirmation.....	7
Adaptability.....	8
Predisposition.....	9
Initiative.....	10

CHAPTER THREE--TACTICAL DECEPTION--VITAL NOW

Deception and Technology.....	12
Environment.....	13
Mission.....	13
Tactical Deception Awareness and the Threat.....	14

CHAPTER FOUR--TACTICAL DECEPTION--VITAL THEN; VITAL NOW

Exercises.....	16
Evaluations.....	17
Professional Military Education.....	18
Conclusion.....	19

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	20
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REPORT NUMBER 87-1985

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JAMES R. PETERSON, USAF

TITLE TACTICAL DECEPTION--VITAL THEN, VITAL NOW

I. Purpose: To create an appreciation for tactical deception's role in warfare and advocate increased emphasis of deception into routine exercises, evaluations, and professional military education.

II. Problem: The advances in technology and surveillance techniques and increasing openness of our society has not reduced deception's value. In addition, with expanding military roles and the ever present Soviet threat, deception can be a cheap force multiplier. Tactical Deception needs greater emphasis for the United States military to fully utilize this tactic.

III. Data: Deception acts as a force multiplier. It makes the weak appear strong and the distant appear near. It causes the enemy commander to act in a way that is beneficial to the deceiver. Deception can cause the enemy to waste his resources on nonexistent targets or mass his armies in the wrong location. In addition, it can insure surprise. The key factors for successful deception are (1) secrecy, organization, and coordination, (2) plausibility and confirmation, (3) adaptability, (4) predisposition, and (5) initiative. Throughout history, deceptions have been successful when these factors were considered. In contrast, if one or more of these factors are ignored, deception fails. Today's advanced technology and sensor equipment have not reduced deception's value. Even with our increasingly open society and mass media, deception is still possible and vital. In addition,

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with the expanding military roles of the United States military, deception can be used at every level of conflict. Finally, the Soviets, the foremost threat, utilize deception extensively. Soviet deception is incorporated into all operations and embraces every level of command. (In order to recognize this tactic as well as use it ourselves, we must continually employ deception techniques and methods.)

IV. Conclusion: To smoothly transition from peace to war we must train as we intend to fight. To do this, routine exercises, evaluations, and professional military education must emphasize how we will fly, fight, and win. Tactical deception is no different. To effectively employ deception we must develop capabilities and techniques in peacetime. Therefore, we must increase its emphasis in those training areas. Tactical deception can be the difference between victory and defeat.

Chapter One

A DECEPTION OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to create an appreciation for the value of tactical deception (TAC-D) and why we should increase its emphasis in routine exercises, evaluations, and PME. It will explain the logic of deception and how it relates to the art of war. It will review through history how deception has influenced warfare. Next, it will examine today's environment and determine if deception is still a vital factor in warfare. Finally, it will state how it could be incorporated into routine exercises, evaluations, and PME.

Tactical deception has proven vital in warfare. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that successful deception by itself enables wars to be won. When resources are stretched and tasks are many, when the forces are evenly matched and the outcome is in the balance, successful deception matters most. (3:146) Deception can be used by heads of state down to wingmen of a flight of tactical fighters. Due to this wide scope of deception, this paper will limit itself to general applications on deception's value in warfare without compromising specific techniques and tactics that are classified. In addition, it will not be limited to any one area or level of conflict, but will include several examples that could apply to today's Air Force mission.

For recommendations, this paper will use a typical tactical fighter wing. It will not be specific on any one type of deception since many of the recommendations are valid for several Air Force missions. The remainder of this chapter will define the deception process and examine why it is vital in warfare.

THE DECEPTION PROCESS

"Gentleman, I notice that there are always three courses open to the enemy, and that he usually takes the fourth." (20:127) This quote by the Prussian Chief of Staff, the Elder Von Molthe, symbolizes the dilemma and problem a commander faces if his foe employs successful deception. He understood the value of

confusing the enemy. To achieve this, it is important to understand tactical deception.

TACTICAL DECEPTION PROGRAM

Air Force Regulation (AFR) 55-49, defines tactical deception as activity designed to mislead the enemy operational commander by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner favorable to friendly interest. (16:1)

Deception can be used in different ways and has two distinguishing variants: the ambiguity-increasing, or A-type, and the misleading, or M-type. (1:5-7) Some scholars refer to these types as passive and active, respectively. (3:132) The A-type deception confuses a target so he does not know what to believe. For example, in support of the Normandy invasion in World War II, the Allies created deceptive invasion threats from Norway to southern France. Some threats proved more plausible than others, but the multiple threats did increase ambiguity. Thus, the Germans had to spread their forces throughout the European coast. (1:5-7) In contrast, the M-type deception reduces ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative. An example of this also occurred in the Normandy invasion. The Allies deceived the Germans to believe Pas de Calais was the invasion point. Increasing the attractiveness of this false location by spreading rumors, bombing, and creating a false invasion force, the Allies made the Germans believe Pas de Calais was the invasion point. (1:5-7) Although the two variants of deception are conceptually distinct, in practice their effects coexist with one another as the deception develops. (1:5-7) The Normandy invasion is a good example. Barton Whaley, a deception expert, simply calls these variants dissimulation and simulation. Dissimulation is merely hiding the real while simulation is showing the false. However, he agrees that both always appear in any single deception operation. (3:186) Another definition states that deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality to gain a competitive advantage. (1:13) In both cases it is a conscious effort to mislead an enemy to cause him to do something to help the deceiver achieve an objective.

Tactical deception is one of two broad types of deception. The other type, strategic deception, is more large-scale and long term. It can be supported by non-military agencies to achieve national policies and plans, although objectives still could be military. (18:2) For example, the Soviet Union used strategic deception from 1955 to 1981 in an attempt to achieve nuclear superiority. They consistently disguised the true strength of their strategic nuclear forces. Through disinformation, political rhetoric, and arms control talks, they claimed strength

when they were weak and claimed parity when they became strong. (3:40-90) Tactical deception, however, is deliberate action to achieve surprise on the battlefield. In addition, it may also support a strategic effort. (18:2) The allied deceptions to support the Normandy invasion, for example, gained surprise on the battlefield and supported the overall strategic objectives. (1:5-7) While there are differences between the two types, the line between the two is not always clear. Many principles apply to both types of deception. (1:3)

TACTICAL DECEPTION'S IMPORTANCE

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you're far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. (5:66-67)

Sun Tzu 500 BC

From the time of Sun Tzu to the most recent US Army field manual, military writers have sought to encompass the art of war in a short set of "principles of war." (20:122) Air Force Manual 1-1, Air Force Doctrine, is no different. Its principles are: objective, offensive, surprise, security, mass and economy of force, maneuver, timing and tempo, unity of command, simplicity, logistics, and cohesion. These "principles of war" represent generally accepted major truths which have proved successful in the art and science of conducting war. (15:2-4) Of these, deception is mentioned in the principle of surprise.

Throughout history, surprise, which is a direct result of deception, is listed in other great warriors' "principles of war." Sun Tzu, Napoleon, Clausewitz, Stalin, Liddel Hart, Giap and Montgomery all list surprise as a principle of war. Jomini substitutes surprise with diversion. (20:122-124)

While all these principles are just as important in their own right, deception can enhance them or force the enemy to violate them. Thus, deception can act as a force multiplier. That is, it magnifies the strength or power of the successful deceiver. Hence, if all things are roughly equal, deception will amplify the deceiver's available strength. Deception also can help a weaker opponent compensate for numerical disadvantage or inadequacies. (3:121)

The invasion of Tinian on 24 July 1944, for example, demonstrates how deception acts as a force multiplier. Tinian

was occupied by 8,000 Japanese. The Americans planned to land 5,000 Marines to capture this island. The island had three beaches, and one was not suitable for landing with existing equipment. Hence, the Marines improvised a simple modification to allow smaller landing crafts to use this beach. In addition, the Marines staged a large feint at the two logical beaches as if they were going to land. Observing this, the Japanese sent reserves to stop the apparent landings. In the meantime, the real landing took place at the third beach with little resistance. In eight days the 8,000 Japanese were all killed or captured. US Marine General Holland called it the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific War. (20:394-395)

Deception can also violate the opponent's concentration of forces, or mass. Deception may misdirect the enemy, causing him to concentrate his force in the wrong place. (3:124) The perfect example of this was the deception plan to support the Normandy invasion. The allies built a false army around General Patton, complete with staff, decoy tanks, landing craft, and other war material. This was to deceive the Germans that this was the invasion force. Several plans and preparations were made, stating that the invasion would be at Pas de Calais. In addition, the allies then began bombing Calais with increasing force, further indicating that Calais was the intended spot. The deception worked. After the Normandy landings and as late as 20 June 1944, Rommel was still expecting an attack at Pas de Calais. There were some twenty German divisions waiting for the attack that could have been used to reinforce the Normandy defenders. It was the greatest deception of the war. (6:129-147) It caused the Germans to mass their forces at the wrong location.

Another principle that can be violated is the principle of economy of force. The intention here is to cause the opponent to waste his resources, such as, time, ammunition, weapons, fuel, and manpower in unimportant directions or even on nonexistent targets. (3:124) During the Battle of Britain, the British caused the Germans to attack nonexistent airfields and factories by using decoys and phony targets. As a result, the Germans wasted resources on false targets which could have been used elsewhere. (3:125)

Finally, deception is designed to surprise the opponent. It can create a situation that will catch him off-guard, unprepared for action. (3:125) Although surprise can be achieved without deception, using deception greatly increases the chance of surprise. (1:187) The advantage of surprise is less casualties. Barton Whaley's analysis of casualties in selected cases from 1914-1967 surmises that operations with the element of surprise and deception have a 1 to 6.3 casualty ratio in favor of the deceiver. In contrast, on an operation with no surprise or deception, the ratio was 1 to 1.1. (20:145)

This chapter has examined the two broad types of deception and how deception acts as a force multiplier. The next chapter will explain the factors needed to insure successful deception.

Chapter Two

TACTICAL DECEPTION-VITAL THEN

DECEPTION FACTORS

For deception to succeed, one must consider certain factors which help the deceiver formulate his deception plan. This chapter will examine these factors and provide examples of how they influence deception plans. These factors are (1) secrecy, organization, and coordination, (2) plausibility and confirmation, (3) adaptability, (4) predispositions of the target and, (5) initiative. (1:16) The examples given will highlight certain factors. However, other factors will be evident because all these factors influence (to a degree) any deception.

SECRECY, ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION

Deception requires secrecy, as well as sound organization and coordination. Operations Security (OPSEC) and those functions of information denial must be recognized as vital elements of deception activities. (18:1-2) Secrecy involves two levels. Organization and coordination are directly linked to secrecy, since leaks and security violations are often results from mistakes in the organization and coordination. (1:17) Leaks, however, can create deception by spreading false information and rumors.

In World War I, General Pershing performed one of the great deceptions of the war. His deception illustrates the factor of secrecy, organization and coordination. In 1918 the Americans occupied a sector near St Mihiel. It was a quiet sector, held weakly by both sides. An offensive in this area would threaten vital German railroads, and iron and coal mines. Thus, Pershing decided to advance on St Mihiel.

There was little hope of hiding the gigantic preparations for the attack, but Pershing thought it would be possible to convince the Germans the blow would fall somewhere else. He decided to use deception and convince the enemy that the attack would take place farther south at Belfort.

His staff planned to attack Belfort. Elaborate timetables and schedules were prepared. Plans for bridge replacements,

maps, orders, and munition requirements were generated. Survey teams visited the Belfort area as did General Pershing. Security prevented the Germans learning the real objective of St Mihiel; however, the Belfort plans were discovered.

The Germans moved three divisions south to meet this American threat. Although they thought it could be a ruse, they were convinced the Americans would attack Belfort. After the offensive started at St Mihiel, the Germans still expected an offensive further south. It was one of the most successful operations of the war. (6:61-75)

In contrast, when secrecy fails, the result can be devastation. For example, in the Battle of Midway, Admiral Yamamoto sought to destroy the remaining US Pacific Fleet. The Americans, however, had broken the Japanese code and exposed the Japanese plans. Admiral Nimitz knew the Japanese strength, deployment, strategy, timetable, and place of attack. He also knew the diversions and deception plans to attack the Aleutians. Thus, Nimitz ignored the diversions and planned his own trap. He destroyed four Japanese carriers and one cruiser at a cost of one American carrier and destroyer. The Japanese failed in their objective. (20:A-281)

PLAUSIBILITY AND CONFIRMATION

For deception to be believed, it must be plausible. A deception is doomed if the target is highly skeptical about the deceiver's capabilities. If, however, a deception is believable, the more likely it will be received. In addition, a lie is made more plausible when it has been confirmed by a variety of sources. The more credible the sources, the better. Also, the more signals a deceiver can send to a target, the more acceptable his deception. (1:18)

OPERATION BOLO is an example of how a deception can be plausible. During late 1966 in Vietnam, Soviet-built fighters, known as MIGS, increased their activity against American strike aircraft. Something had to be done to counter this threat. The MIGS, however, due to political restrictions, were immune as long as they were on the ground. Thus, the MIGS could feint air attacks against American strike aircraft, force the US jets to jettison their bomb loads prematurely, then return to the safety of North Vietnamese bases. They would not confront US jets in air-to-air combat.

In order to counter the threat in air-to-air combat, a deception plan (OPERATION BOLO) was conceived. The mission hinged on a large force of airborne F-4s at staggered intervals to confront the MIGS. The force was split into two sections. The West force was tasked to attract the MIGS and prevent them

from landing at two airfields. The second section, the East force, was tasked to prevent the MIGS from landing at two different airfields and block any escape to bases to the North.

The West force used an elaborate ruse to make the Phantoms appear to the enemy as F-105s. The F-4s used F-105 tanker refueling tracks and altitudes, approach routes and altitudes, airspeeds, and radio call signs. This made the deception plausible to the enemy because the F-4s imitated the F-105s in every possible way. As the mission unfolded, the MIGS took the bait and launched to intercept the suspected F-105s. Without the loss of a single US aircraft, OPERATION BOLO had accounted for the destruction of seven MIG-21s--nearly half of the North Vietnamese operational inventory at that time. (2:35-41)

A deception plan can not be plausible if the enemy simply fails to catch the bait of deception offered to him. Israel, for instance, often found that very polished and seemingly simple deception plans were not recognized by Arab intelligence organizations because they were not good enough to identify the bait offered. What may make sense to the deceiver, because he may know what to look for, may not necessarily make sense to the intended victim. (3:135)

ADAPTABILITY

As the truth changes, so must the deception if the lie is to remain plausible and believable. Otherwise, the divergence will expose the lie. This is why adaptability, the third factor, is important. In addition, determining how the enemy is reacting to the deception is important. Deceptions, while normally short-lived, may be carried out longer if the deceiver can adapt to the target's reactions. (1:20)

In the Israel-Egypt War of 1967, Israel used a deception similar to the Normandy Invasion. They simulated a buildup of landing craft as if they were preparing for amphibious operations (in the Gulf of Aqaba), and increased torpedo boat patrols. To further convince Egypt, General Sharon's forces put dummy tanks on his southern flank and lined up his forces as if they were going to move south towards the Gulf of Aqaba.

When hostilities commenced, the Israelis pushed north and west instead of south. They used strict Communication Security (COMSEC) procedures and even infiltrated the Egyptian radio net. The Egyptians were caught off guard.

When the Israelis overran El Arish airfield, they put Arabian-speaking Israelis with Egyptian accents in the control tower. Thus, the Egyptians believed that El Arish had not been captured. These controllers then induced Egyptian fighters to

land for refueling and debriefing. Convinced the airfield was still in friendly hands, Egyptian fighters began to land where they were captured or destroyed. The deception gave Israel total surprise; they never let the Egyptians recover. The war was over in six days. (19:101)

Not adapting to the enemy's reactions can defeat a deception because the enemy may not act as expected. In 1941, the British used deception against the Italians in Somalia. The British were outnumbered by a ratio of 2 to 1 and wanted to divert Italians away from where they were going to attack. The attack was planned in the North, so the British wanted forces withdrawn from the North to the South. They convinced the Italians the attack was going to occur in the South by simulating attack preparations.

The deception worked; however, instead of reinforcing the South, the Italians decided not to fight and withdrew to the North where the real attack was planned. The deception worked, but did not fully adapt to the enemy's reactions. As a result, the Italians did the opposite of what the British wanted. (4:81-82)

PREDISPOSITION

Target predisposition is also a big factor in the success of deception. If you know what the enemy is expecting, you can easily do the unexpected. Moreover, if your deception is slanted in the direction the target is predisposed to take, it is much more convincing. However, if your deception is not in the direction of his predispositions, it is less believable. Deceptions that successfully played on a target's predispositions are much more numerous than those that reversed a target's expectations. (1:23) Being able to think like the adversary is also important. What makes sense to the deceiver will not necessarily make sense to the target. (3:135) During the American Civil War, the North's General Sherman used deception in the capture of Atlanta. The city's defenders were so well intrenched, Sherman could not break the defenses. He learned from Shilo and Vicksburg the futility of the frontal assault, so he decided on deception to dislodge the defenders. Due to the hopes and predisposition of the defenders, his deception plan worked.

He ordered his army to the west of Atlanta. Wagon wheels were muffled and troops were told to be as quiet as possible with whistling and coughing forbidden. Only enough supplies for the operation were taken. The rest was moved North to be held until after the operation. Some supplies and material were left at the line in such a manner that would appear the Union Army left in confusion and defeat.

When the Confederates finally detected the movement and discovered the abandoned Union positions, they felt Sherman was retreating. Southern newspapers, government officials, and citizens believed Sherman had failed, and was retreating North to regroup. Everyone in Atlanta had new hope.

Sherman could not have conceived that his deception would have been so easily swallowed by the Confederates. By the time the movement was completed, he stated, "I have Atlanta as certainly as if it were in my hand." On August 28, the Union Army marched on Atlanta and immediately seized strategic positions with few losses. The swing movement from West to South was working.

General Hood, the Confederate commander, realized he had been thoroughly deceived. He would have to fight for the life of Atlanta in a battlefield of the enemy's choosing--if he could rush enough troops there in time. So confused were the defenders by Sherman's unexpected reappearance at the southern approaches, everything went wrong for the Confederates. Finally, Hood evacuated Atlanta, leaving behind supplies or blowing them up. Because the Confederates' predisposition was to believe Sherman was retreating, the deception worked well. (6:15-22)

In contrast, deception in the WWII Battle of the Sangro failed because it did not consider the enemy's predisposition. In 1943 during the Italian Campaign, the British fought the Germans in the Battle of the Sangro. General Montgomery's 18 divisions were opposed by 15 German divisions. The British objective was to advance up the Italian peninsula past the Sangro River. The approach chosen for the advance was up the main coastal highway because it was the only road large enough to carry an advancing corps. A deception plan was incorporated to deceive the Germans on where the advance would occur. Montgomery simulated preparations for a large scale attack at the opposite end of his front. This would divert enemy troops and prevent reserves from being committed to the coastal highway. The deception failed. The German's predisposition was the same as the British. They knew the coastal highway was the logical point of attack. The deception failed to change the Germans' mind and the attack was stopped after only a three mile advance. (20:A342-6)

INITIATIVE

Initiative affects much of the deception process. A major advantage that initiative contributes to successful deception is time. Being able to act when ready, the initiating side has the luxury of using the available time to develop deception plans if desired. In contrast, the defenders must respond hastily to the

action if it is ready or not. (1:24) This is not to say defensive deception will fail, but there is an advantage with initiative because one has time to develop a good deception plan.

The Normandy invasion is a perfect example. This deception, as described in the previous chapter, could not have worked if the Allies did not have the time to plan and develop it. (3:174) Without time, it is much harder to deceive. The Germans' use of deception declined late in World War II because time resources and information ran out. (3:174)

Other failures of initiative occur when no deception plan is developed for an operation even if there is time. In one portion of the Battle of the Somme in World War I, the British and French failed to use initiative and plan a deception for their offensive. The Germans had a warning of the attack based upon intelligence and a lengthy barrage. The allies threw 27 divisions at the 11.5 German divisions. As a result, the British suffered 60,000 casualties to 25,000 Germans and were defeated. (20:B-39-41)

This chapter has examined factors in deception and has looked at deception in warfare throughout history. The benefits can be considerable if not decisive. Deception will facilitate surprise which can increase the chances for quick and decisive military success, whether measured in terms of goals, ground taken, or casualties. (3:143) It also points out that deception can be counterproductive if the enemy discovers the deception or if he reacts differently than you wanted. The next chapter will examine today's environment and explore if tactical deception is still a vital factor.

Chapter Three

TACTICAL DECEPTION-VITAL NOW

This chapter will discuss factors in today's world and how it relates to tactical deception. Technological advances, environment, possible missions, and the threat all have influences on deception practices. The chapter will explore these areas and analyze if tactical deception is still as vital as it has proven to be throughout history.

DECEPTION AND TECHNOLOGY

Technology has made quantum leaps since World War II. Miniature electronics, satellites, and elaborate command and control systems have made it much easier for commanders to gain information and employ forces. Intelligence gathering, surveillance, and communications are advanced, but do they make deception obsolete?

Aerial reconnaissance is not a recent development. Balloons were used in the Civil War, and aircraft as early as World War I. Today's satellite capabilities, however, have made surveillance the most critical element in military intelligence. (13:69) Satellites, however elaborate, still have limitations. Although onboard sensor and optical systems can be redirected, the satellite itself cannot be moved to a better viewing angle. Also, weather conditions often interfere with viewing the area of concern. (13:69)

Despite these limitations, however, satellites can provide critical information. Thus, the central problem will not be availability of data. It will, however, be the problem of too much data, and finding the means to rapidly extract essential elements of information from otherwise inconsequential or repetitious data sets. (12:42-96) In addition, if the aggressor's objective is a limited one, then his tell-tale preparations will be correspondingly small and not detectable. Surveillance and technical progress in intelligence gathering has not made interpretation any easier nor lessened the possibilities for deception and disinformation. (8:23)

Technology is also a double edged sword. It can be used to deceive. The act of deception is an art supported by technology. When successful it can have a devastating impact on

its intended victim. The deceiver utilizes the victim's surveillance sensors for conveying specific deceptive signals. (9:19) Moreover, the equipment, structures and training of contemporary armies make it difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive preparations and exercises. (8:23) Thus, it will be difficult to detect an enemy's intentions. Despite advances technology has made, it must be realized that all deception takes place in the mind of the enemy. (9:19)

ENVIRONMENT

Technology has also affected our environment today. Since World War II, newspapers tell their stories in hours, with radio and television reporting live. Also, our democratic society is very open. The Freedom of Information Act, investigative reporting, and leaks from various sources make it difficult to execute a deception plan. The Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes do not have this problem due to a more closed society.

Michael I. Handel, a deception authority, also states that the Soviets seem to have fewer scruples about using deception and fraud as an accepted and even common means to conduct foreign policy. In time, this seems to give the totalitarian states a considerable edge over the naive Western democracies; yet this edge may be their undoing in the long run both in peace and war. (3:138-139)

Handel believes those who frequently deceive quickly lose credibility; what they can do one or two times in succession, they cannot do indefinitely. As a result, the Soviets may find themselves in a position in which no one will believe them. Therefore, targets have to be more alert, have better intelligence and eventually resort to similar means. If the Western democracies do, they may turn out to be much better at the game of deception. In addition, Handel believes that someone known to be open and honest will find it hard to lose his reputation and can therefore deceive much better if he wants. Thus, the more one has a reputation for honesty, the easier it is to lie when one wants to. (3:138-139)

MISSION

The mission today can still cover the entire spectrum of conflict. The US must be prepared to counter any threat within that spectrum. In addition, the US military has become more involved with national security policy. Thus, power projection and "show the flag" operations do not call for tactical deception, because the object is to show a visible force and resolve.

Deception has been a significant factor in higher forms of conflict as examples from previous chapters have indicated. However, the United States is increasingly facing a lower level of conflict. One of the more frequent forms is terrorism. Terrorism has increased, especially on Americans and Department of Defense (DOD) resources. In addition, terrorism is being "state sponsored," so it is difficult to combat or resolve diplomatically. This has created a new mission for the military--to strike at terrorist bases to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Tactical deception can play a vital role. It would require complete operations security to avoid compromise and a fatal loss of credibility. (10:67)

The bombing raid on Libya, for example, was an opportunity to employ tactical deception and insure surprise. The use of F-111s from England was an excellent idea because it proved that you do not have to have a carrier off the coast to anticipate an air strike. (11:63) Therefore, when the US Navy's aircraft carriers steam away, terrorists can still be attacked and caught off guard. In addition, you do not have to give away your intentions or allow the terrorist to escape by deploying a carrier task force to the vicinity.

TACTICAL DECEPTION AWARENESS AND THE THREAT

We have examined how tactical deception can be vital in warfare. In addition, despite advances in technology, changes in today's environment, and different military tasking, it still can be vital. We must, however, examine how the Soviet Union uses deception. It is important for us to understand how the Soviets employ deception so commanders can be aware of it and even use it to their advantage. As one of the Air Force specialized tasks, intelligence is essential. Timely and accurate intelligence is vital to decision making because it provides an assessment of what the enemy is getting ready to do, and indications on how, when, and where he may do it. (15:3-7) Deception works against sound intelligence.

The Soviet's Maskirovka is designed to deceive our intelligence and thus our key decision makers. Maskirovka is pervasive in the Soviet military. In fact, the Soviets have formed well equipped specialist units at the operational level purely to implement deception. (8:25) Maskirovka is an amalgam of concealment, camouflage, simulation, and disinformation which combines security and deception. At unit and sub-unit levels, Maskirovka may consist of little more than the use of smoke on a false axis; however, it can become very sophisticated at higher levels. (8:25)

Maskirovka uses eight basic tasks in the operational arena. First, the Soviets mask force strength and movements. Secondly, they block the enemy's perception and identification of new weapons. Next, they distract the enemy's attention from other activities. Fourth, they overload the enemy's intelligence analytical capability. The fifth task they perform is to present an illusion of strength where he is weak. In contrast, the sixth task is to lull the enemy into a false sense of security by presenting an image of weakness where he is really strong. The seventh task accustoms the enemy to particular patterns of behavior, so he does not recognize offensive preparations. And finally, he confuses the enemy's expectations so that he fails to find the correct response to them. (8:25-26)

It is impossible to list all the ingredients of Soviet deception, but it is important to realize that it is incorporated thoroughly into their military. We must study deception because the Soviets have used it throughout history and will probably use it again.

This chapter has looked at today's world, with increased technology, open environment, mission requirements, and the Soviet Maskirovka threat. It has examined if deception still can be vital today as it was in history. In all cases deception remains valid in today's world.

Due to the nature of deception, it is still a key factor despite changes in today's world. In addition, since the Soviet places considerable emphasis on deception, it is vital that we understand its use so that we can counter it.

The next chapter will analyze why we should increase emphasis on tactical deception and increase its use in exercises, evaluations, and professional military education.

Chapter Four

TACTICAL DECEPTION-VITAL THEN-VITAL NOW

Modern deception will require much greater skill in highly technical areas, as well as detailed and systematic preparations. Greater efforts for the preparation of deception plans will have to be made in peace time so they will be available if war occurs. (3:146) This chapter will examine how this can be done by creating greater emphasis on routine military exercises, evaluations, and PME. Air Force Manual 1-1 states, "For the military professional, there is no simple formula to learn warfighting. Gaining that knowledge is a continuous process that is the product of institutionalized education and training, experience, and personal effort." (15:2-4)

EXERCISES

Exercises and training are what makes our Armed Forces credible. Major General Larry N. Tibbets states, "Properly trained and motivated people are as essential to Air Force readiness as spare parts and ammunition." (14:2) It is important to properly train for tactical deception to be ready to use it. We must train the same way we intend to fight. The best way to learn a skill is by doing it, not being told how to do it. (7:26)

To ensure the readiness of our forces, commanders must develop and implement training programs that build required warfighting skills that simulate, as closely as possible, the combat environment in which we expect to fight. (15:4-7) Exercises have been developed to do just that. To fully prepare, tactical deception should be incorporated. Tactical deception training, however, must ensure protection of sensitive techniques and capabilities. (16:1) It therefore should be used or participants approved by the next higher level of command.

In applying tactical deception in training, you may consider several possible options. One would be to incorporate it in a deployment for an exercise at another base. For example, your objective is to deploy a package of fighters to a different location to participate in an exercise, such as Red Flag. Your goal would be to deploy without being detected or revealing your final destination. Using the principles of deception and your imagination, it is possible to use various tactical deception techniques to achieve your objective.

The principle of secrecy, organization, and coordination would be essential. Strict coordination of operations and maintenance would be needed so one side would know what the other is doing. Strict COMSEC and OPSEC procedures would be used. In addition, using a communication-out recall could be used to keep the deployment secret. Runners would be used instead of FM radios. Since everyone in the deployment would have to know the destination and time, it would be difficult to keep the secret within a small core organization.

To have your deception plausible, develop a believable alternative. Stagger the aircraft takeoffs to simulate that they are just going on a training flight or cross-country to different bases. Fake flight plans, flight orders, and schedules could confirm this alternative and add credibility to it.

Be ready to adapt the deception based upon changes to the real mission. Weather, delays, or changes in the real schedule may force you to change your story. Based on feedback, one can adjust the deception to carry it out for an indefinite amount of time.

In this exercise, your target will probably be an evaluator or at least an approved participant, so his predisposition of your action may be known. However, he still might not know when or where. Your deception can target these factors to achieve successful results. False time tables and paced activity instead of surge operations could be helpful.

Finally give the plan time to develop. The principle of initiative is utilized when you have the time to develop and execute your plan. Plan ahead and develop the deception based upon your goal.

Training as we would fight is vital to our readiness. Realistic training facilitates an effective transition from peace to war. (15:4-7)

EVALUATIONS

To analyze whether or not your tactical deception has been effective, it is important to evaluate it. The Air Force Inspection System is designed to do just that. By increasing the emphasis of tactical deception during inspections, units can be evaluated on their performance and readiness.

In addition, the inspection system is designed to find and resolve problems and identify good management methods. It also can validate and compare information available through other

channels and give you feedback on corrective actions taken and identified deficiencies. (17:4)

During an inspection, as with training, tactical deception techniques and capabilities need to be protected. And since most inspections are tailored to the specific task that a unit may perform in war, this may be difficult.

Therefore, an inspection may best be used during other types of activities, as mentioned before, such as a Red Flag deployment. In addition, the unit could be given a window of time, such as a week, to deploy--giving it more flexibility to execute its deception plan.

Thus the inspector would serve as the target for deception as well as the evaluator for the unit. In addition, the unit's real tactical deception plans would not be compromised. The inspectors, however, could review deception plans that have developed for real contingencies. Evaluations could also be employed on higher decision makers and plans evaluated in wargames and simulations. Within the secure environment of a wargame center, all deception techniques could be evaluated and not compromised.

Evaluations establish the high standards needed in our forces. Tactical deception should be treated no differently than any other task required.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Technical training and operational training are inseparable from professional military training. Development of skills and proficiency without commitment produces a force with an absence of purpose. These two elements, education and training, enhance the competence of our personnel by broadening their perspectives, expanding their knowledge of war, and preparing them to attain leadership positions of increasing scope and responsibility. (15:4-7) By increasing the emphasis of tactical deception in professional military education, increased awareness and knowledge of its role in warfare can be accomplished. This will influence and help produce a professional force that can apply this theory and knowledge to the task of fighting and winning wars. (15:4-7)

Residence school and academics should include or increase lesson plans that examine tactical deception and its role in warfare. Utilizing military history and the theory of deception, possible applications of tactical deception can be studied. In addition, Project Warrior and other professional reading enhancement programs could include tactical deception theories and examples.

With increased emphasis of tactical deception in PME, further research and study can be made to increase its effectiveness and enhance the capabilities of our forces.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined tactical deception. It has defined what tactical deception is and why it is used. It has examined how vital deception has been throughout history, and how it has been used. By examining today's world with its advanced technology, open society, mission tasks, and the threat, tactical deception can still be vital. Therefore, it is important that we increase its emphasis in routine exercises, evaluations, and professional military education. This will enable one to train as he would fight, develop and improve his capabilities, and increase one's awareness and knowledge.

It would be an exaggeration to say that successful deception by itself enables wars to be won. But when resources are stretched and tasks are many, when the forces are evenly matched and the outcome is in the balances, successful deception matters most. (3:146) It was vital then; it is vital now.

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